



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

THE EFFECT OF THE BALKAN WARS ON EUROPEAN ALLIANCES AND THE FUTURE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

BY NORMAN DWIGHT HARRIS

Northwestern University

The Near Eastern question, or Turkey in Europe, has been one of the most difficult and vexatious problems of European statesmen and diplomats ever since the signing of Europe's first treaty with the Ottoman Turks, at Carlowitz, in 1699. It has had a greater influence upon European diplomacy than any other single issue. Reputations have been made and lost by it. Three of the great military conflicts of the nineteenth century—the Russo-Turkish struggle of 1828-29, the Crimean war, and the Russo-Turkish contest of 1877—were caused by one or another phase of this question; and now, within the past two years, recourse to arms has been had twice again over the same debatable ground. The congress of Berlin and the diplomatic moves that followed the war between Russia and Turkey in 1877, led to the creation of the German-Austrian League, and ultimately to the present Triple Alliance. The diplomatic and strategic acts which preceded the war between the Balkan allies and the Ottoman Empire in 1912 and those that accompanied the breaking out and the conclusion of the conflict against Bulgaria in 1913, culminated in new combinations, some of which have elements of permanency.

It is not essential to our purpose to recount here the long story of the struggles and efforts of the European powers to adjust the Balkan difficulties and to settle the question of Turkey in Europe. It will perhaps be sufficient to recall to mind the fact that, through all the years from the establishment of Greek independence till the fall of Adrianople, the European concert failed signally to solve the problem; and that it was the Balkan states themselves who, exasperated by the slowness of the great powers in taking the initiative upon the utter failure of the party of Union and Progress to establish order, security and good government in the European provinces of Turkey, solved the Macedonian phase of the question and transferred the main issue across the Bosphorus into Asia Minor.

Two difficulties have always stood in the way of the European states whenever serious efforts to settle the thorny problem of Turkey in Europe were contemplated: a general ignorance of the real conditions and the proper remedies, and the self-interests of the individual powers leading to a lack of initiative and coöperation. Disraeli was fond of saying, in his day, that only two persons really understood the Balkan question—one a learned German professor lately deceased, and the other, himself—and that he had forgotten it. If the truth were told, Lord Beaconsfield himself never thoroughly comprehended the full significance of the problem, or studied it with an impartial, clear-sighted judgment and a sincere desire to solve it successfully. If he had done so, the British government might not have been credited with a half triumph in 1878 and the question remained practically unchanged till 1912. Unfortunately he saw the situation only through English eyes and from the British standpoint. Like most of the statesmen of Europe who have directed the policy of their states in the Near Eastern diplomacy, he had the interests of his own country more at heart than the welfare of Turkey or the peoples under its control. The Eastern question “only interests Europe,” said Bismark at the congress of Berlin in 1878, “through its effect upon the relations of the great powers among themselves.” This has remained true from that day to this.

In spite of the good intentions and efforts of British and Austrian ministers, the reforms promised for European Turkey by the Ottoman government at the time of the Berlin congress were never introduced and the excellent European plans pressed on the sultan from 1904 to 1908 with considerable diplomatic vigor never passed beyond the paper stage. Owing to the failure of the new constitutional government to “make good” in Macedonia after three years’ trial, due to the dissensions of the leaders, the inexperience and incompetency of the officials selected for the work and the attempt to “Ottomanize” the whole country and obliterate all national lines, the Balkan affairs again reached a crisis in 1912. In February, negotiations were opened between Bulgaria and Greece resulting in an alliance for peace and protection formed in May to last three years. Similar conversations were begun between Bulgaria and Servia, culminating in a treaty of alliance on March 13. Protection was to be given the Christians of Macedonia; and, in the event of a war and victory over Turkey, the territory should be so divided by a line running from the intersection of Servia and Bulgaria to the junction of the Struga valley with Lake Ochrida, that the lion’s share of Macedonia would go to Bulgaria. Military conventions were concluded between

the same powers in May and September; and, owing to a massacre of Bulgarians at Kotchany and Servians at Berané and the announcement that the fall manoeuvres of the Turkish army would be held near the Bulgarian frontier, the armies of Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece were all mobilized on September 30 and October 1. The great powers counseled patience and caution, but proceeded to approach Turkey on the matter of reform with great deliberation. Impatient of delay and suspicious of the motives of the concert, the Balkan allies sent an ultimatum to the Ottoman government on October 13. The Turkish grand vizier refused to treat with them and, after he had concluded peace with Italy on the 15th, declared war upon the Balkan states. Thus began the first war that brought defeat and disaster to the Turks and culminated in the peace of London, signed on May 30, 1913, depriving them of most of their European possessions.

While the delegates of the Balkan allies and of Turkey were holding deliberations in Buckingham Palace, the representatives of the great powers met daily near by and kept in touch with all that went on, in order that their own interests and those of the peace of Europe should in no way be injured by the proposed treaty. The European concert posed as a neutral, both in this conflict against Turkey and in the war that followed against Bulgaria; but this does not mean that its acts were always impartial, consistent and intended to further the interests of all the interested parties. Sir Edward Grey, representing Great Britain, deserves great credit for the impartiality and the spirit of conciliation with which he conducted all the negotiations. He was well sustained in his position and acts by France and Russia, but the same cannot be said of members of the Triple Alliance. And just here we notice another of the chief weaknesses of the European concert. No state, not even the best-intentioned, had elaborated a definite Balkan policy—one that should settle the Balkan question once and for all time and that should conserve at the same time the welfare and vital interests of all concerned: the Balkan states, Turkey and the European neighbors. The result was disastrous. Those states who, like Austria and Italy, had special interests in the Turkish European provinces and pressed their schemes, got what they wanted; but the affairs of the Balkan allies and of Turkey were allowed to drift, as if they had little relation to the rest of the problem.

By insisting upon the creation of a large, autonomous Albania, Austria and Italy for the sake of their special interests in the Adriatic and its seaboard forced Serbia to relinquish her hope of a little window on the

Adriatic sea and Greece and Montenegro to give up certain legitimate territorial ambitions. This undoubtedly contributed largely to the conditions and forces which brought about the second Balkan war; for Bulgaria refused Serbia compensation elsewhere, and Greece, feeling uncertain of the decision of the concert in the matter of the Aegean islands, was ready to make good her losses in Albania by territorial acquisitions in Macedonia. Then with a seeming indifference to their own earlier policy and decisions, the European concert permitted the treaty of London to be torn into shreds, the Balkan allies to fight over the spoils of the first war, and Turkey again to enter the arena and to recapture Adrianople. Russia would have gladly prevented these last acts in the drama. She offered to mediate between the Balkan states and sent two warships to the eastern entrance of the Bosphorus to warn the Ottoman government to keep its hands off; but such a program could only have been carried out with the support of Austria and England, which unfortunately was lacking at the critical moment.

The indecision, or lack of policy, among the great powers, while not affecting the harmony of the elements composing the Triple Alliance and the "Quadruple Entente," has resulted in a curious but effective drawing together of certain forces heretofore opposed to each other. In the first place, Roumania, led by the pressure of public sentiment which had been strongly opposed to the government's policy of neutrality in the first war, the desire to adjust the Bulgarian-Roumanian boundary dispute to its own satisfaction and the wish to see the Balkan question settled quickly and in a stable manner, joined Serbia and Greece in the contest with Bulgaria. The last named country, formerly the recognized "strong man" and self-appointed leader of the Balkan states, fell from its high estate—a result not a little induced by the recapture of Adrianople and the threatened invasion of Bulgaria by the Turks. Her place as a real, but a prudent and conciliatory, leader has been taken by Roumania. The young Balkan alliance, which started so determinedly and auspiciously, also fell to the ground with the outbreak of this second war; but it has been promptly replaced by another, which exists in fact, though not officially announced by name, composed of Roumania, Serbia and Greece. This has been amply attested by the unanimity and co-operation displayed by the new allies in all the activities of the second Balkan war, the negotiations for peace and the subsequent events. The important and conciliatory rôle played by M. Take Jonescu, the Roumanian minister of the interior, in bringing the Turko-Greek treaty negotiations to a happy and successful conclusion is another evidence of the existence and the value of the new combination.

Roumania is indeed determined not only to retain the leadership in Balkan politics, which rightfully belongs to her, but also to use her influence to further in every way the peace and prosperity of the Balkans. She recognizes the individual rights and interests of the various states, and desires that a happy equilibrium should be maintained among these small powers. The salvation of the Balkans, in fact, depends upon the successful cultivation of the "Balkan spirit" among its native states, a spirit which combines the sentiment of the Balkans for the Balkan peoples with the broad humanitarian doctrine that each community is entitled to a livable territory and the right to share equitably in the trade and prosperity of Europe and the Near East. Heretofore the selfishness and rivalry of these states has been the chief obstacle to the development and prosperity of the Balkan peninsula. Ever since they secured independence from Ottoman control, they have remained separate, suspicious and hostile. The debatable land of Macedonia and Albania has been a thorn in their sides and a source of discord and bitter rivalry. Now that this question has been settled, it is high time to lay aside these old animosities and to coöperate for the common good. Every state can afford to concede something commercially, or otherwise, for the common welfare. It is encouraging to see one community, Roumania, taking the lead in this direction; and it is to be hoped that all the others will coöperate with her to promote peacefully and adroitly the interests of the Balkan peoples, not only for their own sake, but also for the welfare and peace of Europe.

The treaty of Constantinople signed by Turkey and Bulgaria on November 13, 1913, restored Adrianople and Kirk Kasilli to the former, assured her of sufficient territory in Europe to make her interest in the Balkans still a vital one, and created, strange as it may seem, a strong friendship between Bulgaria and the Ottoman government. The Bulgarians are more Turanian than Slavic and at bottom nationally nearer to the Turks than to the Slavs of the Balkans. Commercially, too, their interests have much in common, and, now that Bulgaria has been left out of the Balkan alliance, various other considerations draw her towards the Ottoman Empire. Although there is no official confirmation of a Turko-Bulgarian "entente"—widely mooted in Turkish and Grecian circles at the time of the signing of the treaty of Constantinople—little doubt exists that these powers will coöperate in the future.

Count Berchtold, the Austrian minister of foreign affairs, declared in a speech to the Austro-Hungarian diet on November 20, 1913, that the territorial expansion of his country was ended with the annexation of

Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. In various other speeches during the past year he has made it clear that henceforth Austria's interests in the Balkans will be economic rather than territorial, and that she is definitely committed to the preservation of the "status quo." All further expansion for Turkey and Bulgaria being out of the question, the interests of all three powers in the Balkans have become very largely identical and are being unified through a mutual competition with the Serb and the Greek. Ferdinand of Bulgaria has recently paid an extended visit to Vienna, and an understanding has probably been reached on matters of common interest. Since Roumania, whose friendship Austria had been studiously cultivating for some years, has become the friend and supporter of Servia—an old rival and competitor of Austria in the matter of territorial and commercial expansion in the Balkans—the statesmen of the Ballplatz welcomed the discredited king of Bulgaria as a friend whose services in the future may be invaluable. So there is a drawing together of Roumania, Servia and Greece on the one side, and of Turkey and Bulgaria sustained by Austria-Hungary on the other; and an equilibrium is being established in the Balkans, which possesses elements of strength and stability.

Another noticeable effect of the Balkan wars is the large increase in the war budgets of Austria and Germany recently passed by the national assemblies of the two countries. \$67,290,000.00, in addition to the regular funds, will be expended by Austria-Hungary on her military service, and her army increased by 31,000 within five years. It has been already raised by 58,000 officers and men during the past two years, within which period Germany has added over 38,000 to her military forces with the official proposal to recruit 136,000 more officers and men inside of the next few years. Russia and France are planning to equalize these additions by similar increases in their own armies. Among the considerations which moved the statesmen of Berlin and Vienna to adopt this new military policy, none was more potent than the fact that the presence of a Slavic alliance in the Balkans sustained by Russia will hereafter neutralize a large portion of the Austrian army in the event of the outbreak of hostilities between the great powers of Europe, for a number of regiments will have perforce to be permanently stationed near the southern boundary of the Austrian Empire. To offset this situation, as well as to secure the coöperation of Great Britain in preserving the "status quo" in the Mediterranean naval situation, in maintaining the equilibrium of the Balkans and in procuring an equitable share in the trade and future economic development of Asia Minor, the Austrian

government has lately begun to cultivate the friendship of the British. The recent visit of the Austrian heir-apparent, Franz Ferdinand, to London, his warm reception there and the frantic efforts of the Austrian press and statesmen to conciliate the British leaders, all indicate clearly which way the wind blows.

The great result, however, of the Balkan wars has been the removal of the Near Eastern question from the Balkans to Asia Minor and its transformation—for some time to come at least—from a territorial to an economic and commercial contest. As a consequence, the first and most fundamental step in the direction of a final and successful solution of the Near East problem is the preservation of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Fortunately, no one is ready for its partition. None of the large or small powers who claim to have special interests in Asia Minor are prepared for such an emergency. Nor, since not a single state among them has clearly formulated its own policy to be pursued, pursuant to the culmination of such an event, can any of them view the dismemberment of Turkey with equanimity. Then, too, events have been coming so fast in the near Orient of which a famous French writer once said: "The World moves, but the Near East stands still," that old Europe herself has hardly had time to grasp the full meaning of it all. She desires a little breathing spell in which to catch her breath and get ready for the next round.

All the members of the European concert are a unit in desiring the maintenance of the present Empire of the Turks. This, however, does not mean that the powers have united upon a common policy towards the Asia Minor kingdom, or have evolved any practical plan for the real solution of the Near Eastern question. On the contrary, from this point of mutual accord the members of the Concert begin almost at once to diverge from each other in action and in policy. Germany and Russia, acting independently of the others, are insisting upon the introduction by the Ottoman government of certain reforms in Armenia. Germany, in spite of the remonstrations of Russia and France, has accepted a high position in the Turkish army for one of her own officers; but Great Britain has declined to permit any of her officials to take prominent governmental positions in the Turkish service. Broad, statesmanlike views of a great international problem are being obscured by the special interests of the different European statesmen, each contending for the commercial and material advancement of his own particular state. Instead of quietly and thoroughly studying the question and deciding upon a definite scheme and a common program of action the fundamentals

of which could be adhered to and executed gradually and along general lines, no matter what the future may bring, the great Powers are utilizing all their energies in a competition for commercial concessions and special spheres of influence within the Turkish Empire. And, unless something unforeseen happens to change the present policy of the concert, it is not unlikely that the sudden failure of the existing régime or the outbreak of another crisis in Turkey—two or ten years from now—will find the powers as ill-prepared for prompt and concerted action as they were in 1878, 1908 or 1912.

The hold of the four leading states, Russia, Germany, France and Great Britain, upon certain portions of the Ottoman dominions is remarkable, and in all probability can never be shaken off. Russia has a large interest commercially in the northeastern section of Asia Minor, and a special religious and ethnical connection with the Armenians of that region. A large portion of the old kingdom of Armenia lies now within her own domains and many of the Armenian residents of Turkey have become Russian subjects for the sake of protection. Then too, the great Tzar of Moscow is the recognized head and protector of all the Greek (and others not Roman Catholics) Christians in the Ottoman Empire. In addition, the Russian government possesses a great hold in Palestine, Syria and elsewhere through the numerous Russian Jews who look to them always for protection, the thousands of Russian pilgrims who find their way to Asia Minor every year and the innumerable Russian and Greek churches, monasteries, hospitals, shrines and public buildings scattered all the way from Jerusalem to Constantinople.

Germany controls the Anatolian and Bagdad railways—now nearing completion and running through the heart of the country some 1750 miles from its capital to Bagdad—and various other concessions in Anatolia, the richest section of the Empire. She too, has her churches, hospitals, schools, and public buildings extending in a long line from the Cathedral on Mt. Zion to their magnificent embassy on the heights of Pera, opposite Constantinople. And she stands ever ready to rush to the assistance of the German trader or missionary. France controls the Beirut-Damascus railway, 806 miles in length; is trying to get possession of the Damascus-Mecca railroad, built and owned by Turkey; and has secured a concession to build the Samsun-Sivas road, 1050 kilometers long, in northern Anatolia with branches into Armenia and Kurdistan. She possesses important economic rights in Syria, including the construction of harbors for several of the chief ports, which she would like to see marked out as a special sphere for her own economic activities. The

French Republic, also, is the historic protector of all the Catholics in Palestine and Syria and lends her official assistance to all the various Catholic orders that, like the Franciscans, have numerous monasteries, schools and public buildings of all kinds on Turkish soil. Great Britain enjoys the greatest popularity among the people of Syria, Arabia, Mesopotamia and Turkey generally today. This is due chiefly to her reputation for honesty and fair-dealing, and the excellence of her methods in education and training. Then it is well known that the English government does not officially support British schools and churches and has no definite program of territorial expansion. Yet even this country has its own commercial and strategic interests to guard in Syria, Mesopotamia, Arabia and Busra. Her subjects own the Smyrna-Aidin railway, together with various other economic concessions in Asia Minor, and within the past month an English corporation has been given the control of the imperial naval works at Constantinople with complete powers of reconstruction and development.

Just now "conversations" are very nearly completed between Germany and Great Britain, and well under way between Germany and France, in which a serious and skillful attempt is being made to define accurately the precise sphere of influence of each of the countries concerned and to divide equitably their respective shares in the future economic development of the Ottoman Empire. Germany wants the lion's share of Anatolia—the richest and most populous section of Turkey—and northern Mesopotamia. France has her eyes on northern and central Syria and a portion of Northeastern Anatolia and western Armenia; while Great Britain seeks to protect her interests in southern Mesopotamia (Bagdad and Busra), Arabia, Palestine and southern Syria. This move towards a commercial invasion and partition of the Ottoman Empire, though in some ways open to question and criticism, has one excellent feature. This is the recognition of the right of all nations to share in the opening of new fields of economic development and financial investment, which is the outcome of the new humanitarian spirit in international relations, that is rapidly replacing the old selfish individualism. It is a great step forward—particularly towards the realization that the Near Eastern question is an international, not an individual state, problem, and must be settled upon a purely international basis. For the first time, three at least of the members of the European concert have united in a serious attempt to define their positions and interests clearly. It is true that thus far this is largely a selfish move; but it will go a long way towards the establishment of a general understanding on certain

vital points, the prevention of irritating intrigues and conflicts and the creation of a sound basis for concerted action and coöperation in the future.

For the present, much depends on the success or failure of the new Turkish government. The party of Union and Progress, now in control and the only organized political agency in the Empire, secured its return to office in January, 1913, through the coup d'état resulting in the death of Nazim Pasha and the resignation of Kiamil Pasha. Its success in recovering Adrianople won for it a sudden, yet secure place in the public eye, in spite of its failures and mistakes in 1909, 1910 and 1911. The appearance in its ranks of some of the younger statesmen of the best families, like Prince Said Halim, the present grand vizier, his brother and others, has given the party a prestige and social standing heretofore lacking. Some of the able and honest politicians who retired to private life two years ago because of disagreements with the earlier leaders of the party, have returned and are furnishing a backbone to the organization; and a good start towards the reorganization of the government and the introduction of many needed reforms has been made.

The difficulties and dangers, however, which beset its pathway, while not unsurmountable, are nevertheless tremendous and alarming. Great tact, patience, perseverance and good judgment are essential to the success of the new régime, all of which the leaders may possess. But more than these qualities, excellent as they are, the reforming statesmen should have an extensive experience in public affairs, a discriminating and statesmanlike grasp of the whole situation, its needs and possibilities, and a whole-hearted and unselfish devotion to the country and its people. The earlier failures of the party of Union and Progress may have taught its promoters several important lessons; but the confidence of the public in their ability, sincerity and disinterested patriotism can only be restored through a series of material, wide-spread and national successes.

Three things the new government will have to contend with: political corruption and incapacity within its own circles, a strong and general movement toward a decentralization of power throughout the Empire, and the influence of European states within and without the country. With an excellent system of law and a form of government based on certain fundamental and workable principles, Turkey has been one of the worst governed states in the world for at least three centuries. This has been due largely to political corruption and the centralization of all authority in the hands of the Constantinople rulers and their representatives, who were more concerned in squeezing money out of the citizens of the Empire than in ruling it wisely and well. The monarchs

for many years have been either incapable, indolent men who permitted their officials to exercise every form of graft, or unscrupulous, skillful tyrants, like Abdul Hamid, who exercised the sovereignty very largely for their own aims and interests.

Now that the current has turned towards constitutional government, a general revulsion of feeling against the Constantinople officials has set in, accompanied by a lack of confidence in the central authority and a desire to shift to the provincial assemblies as much power as possible, particularly in local affairs. In this connection it must be borne in mind that the Turks came into Asia Minor and southeastern Europe as conquerors and that they have always looked upon the other nationalities as subject peoples entitled only to such rights and privileges as should be meted out to them. In Europe the Ottomans were greatly outnumbered and could not afford to compromise a great deal in this matter. But in Asia Minor they possess an immense majority and should be much more conciliatory, particularly as there are thousands of Armenians, Kurds and Arabs who need only a little generous and fair treatment to make them loyal and staunch supporters of the new régime. The leaders of the party of Union and Progress are, unfortunately, showing signs of weakness at this point, and are clinging as firmly as ever to the reins of power. They have declined to admit the representatives of the other nationalities in the Empire to the new national assembly on the basis of proportional representation. For the present, they have tried to meet the situation by granting to each class a limited representation in this popular body, provided a certain percentage of these members shall belong to the party of Union and Progress, and by giving more power to the provincial assemblies together with a fuller representation of Armenians, Arabs, Syrians or Kurds, as the case might be.

The exhaustion of the country and the enormous increase in the public debt caused by the recent wars, the lack of ready funds or large private capital, the pressing need of complete organization in the whole governmental machinery, and of innumerable public improvements, and the very limited number of trained native officials and experts, are all forcing the Turkish government to resort to the aid of foreign capital and of European civil and military officers. They are trying, however, to get this assistance without seriously compromising themselves or selling their country and its resources—a task requiring consummate diplomatic skill, such as only the Turks possess, and a resourcefulness inexhaustible. Asia Minor possesses considerable natural wealth and a trade of no mean proportions; and, if the European states can be held off a few years so that their holdings and concessions do not become too

extensive and perpetual, the Turks may work out their own salvation successfully. The situation is indeed difficult and precarious, but the key to it lies in the ability of the Ottoman statesmen to establish an efficient government and to give proper protection to the foreign interests and investments, within their Empire. For, if this is done, the European concert is not likely to inaugurate any movement for the joint occupation or division of the Turkish domains.

As a "buffer state," Turkey has a well recognized position and function; and, as a field for commercial and industrial investment, she is becoming a source of great interest and profit to all the powers, including Italy. If she, then, can justify her position as a well-governed neutral state and as an economic factor in the development of the Near East, her position is assured for years to come. To accomplish this, economy and steady progress are necessary. No more wars, or fruitless civil conflicts, must be indulged in. Peace is the greatest need, and wish, of Turkey as well as of the Balkan States. To make its position secure, the Ottoman government must, in addition, reorganize its army, create a small but efficient navy, and cultivate certain international friendships. With a well-trained and properly equipped army, its relations with Bulgaria and Austria may become a bulwark of safety against local disturbances. With a respectable navy, her statesmen can court the friendship of the Triple Alliance which is striving to maintain a balance of naval power in the Mediterranean through the fleets of Austria and Italy, and raise a barrier against the aggression of Russia or England.

The contest over Turkey, known as the Near Eastern question, has become, therefore, an economic rather than a territorial problem, and has been removed from the Balkan Peninsula to Asia Minor. Yet, as the Slavs may one day break the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and with it the Triple Alliance, the Turks may disrupt the Triple Entente by starting a contest for the possession of their territory, which will force Russia and Great Britain to take opposite sides and arouse Europe to an unprecedented struggle. England, France and Austria are now strongly for peace; and the new policy of commercial division may lead to nothing more than a peaceful partition of the Ottoman territories. It most certainly behooves the European concert, in any event, to study the situation with great care, to observe the developments with alertness and watchfulness, and to elaborate a definite policy with regard to the future, so that it will not again be caught napping, or be the laughing stock of the World for its slowness and lack of coöperation, as on former occasions.